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FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS: A CURRENT
ACCOUNT
WILLIAM LAURENS WALKER*
In an eariler issue of this volume, the author examined the history
of foreign corporation laws and concluded that their original justifica-
tion has disappeared. In this article, he turns to an assessment of the
present utility of the laws. The burdens that these laws impose on
interstate business outweigh their benefits, according to the author, who
argues that they are open to judicial attack under the commerce clause
of the Constitution. The article concludes with a suggestion that
legislative repeal of the present foreign corporation laws is desirable.
INTRODUCTION
The original reason for foreign corporation laws is lost, and their
conceptual foundation is today largely discredited. State qualification
statutes were adopted to solve problems created by a nineteenth century
constitutional requirement that original legal process be served within the
boundaries of forum states. The operating principle of the laws was also
the product of an unusual nineteenth century development-the proposi-
tion that states can admit out-of-state corporations upon condition be-
cause, it was said, they could exclude them entirely. Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have eliminated the service of process requirement and
modern juridical thinking has cut deeply into the acceptability of the
principle of conditional entry. These developments have been discussed
in an earlier article.'
Time has not supplied a new rationale. The statutes have not developed
a major new purpose, and in a number of their aspects-particularly those
relating to jurisdiction to adjudicate, choice of law, and taxation-the laws
themselves have already caused problems and promise more. At most, the
present utility of this expanding and complex scheme is minimal.
Measurement of the current role of the statutes against the conflicting
economic interests of a national market suggests both the desirability
and the shape of judicial and legislative solutions to this problem of aimless
regulation. A more traditional balancing of state and national interests
gives the same result. The courts should refuse to enforce the statutes as
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L. REv. 1
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Walker].
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contrary to the commerce clause, and legislatures should eliminate the laws
from corporation codes.
I. PRESENT UTILITY, OF FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
Occasionally a legal technique outlives its original purpose but de-
velops new and valuable functions. A sound judgment of the foreign
corporation law schenie should i ncllh "consideration of this possibility
and'a determination of the present 'utiifty of the qualification statutes.
The diversity of detail in fifty acts demands selection of requirements
worth careful attention. The most frequently.enacted are discussed below
because apparently a number of legislatures thought them to be useful. 2
A. Local Agents
The only condition adopted by every state is that foreign corporations
name local residents as their agents to accept process. The piecemeal
overruling of Pennoyer and the consequent development of provisions
for service of process on corporations and others outside forum juris-
dictions have eliminated any jurisdictional reason to require local agents.3
In those few states that do not have long arm statutes, service on agents
within the forum is still required. But it is of little value to speculate
about refusal to provide out-of-state service since most states have already
adopted the statutes and no doubt within a brief time every state will follow
suit. Perhaps requiring local agents is a convenience to local plaintiffs,
but where out-of-state service by mail is available it is debatable whether
that procedure is less convenient than arranging for local personal de-
livery.' Moreover, requirements that foreign corporations designate local
agents have significant negative impact. Curiously, this effect was brought
about by three of the nation's most respected judges.
In Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,5 the New York
'The special problems presented by essentially local corporations incorporated
in another state are not considered in the analysis that follows. In the case of those
"pseudo-foreign corporations," as they were named by Dean E. R. Latty, the eco-
nomic principles discussed at 753-55, infra suggest that a high degree of local super-
vision would be acceptable because there would be little effect on beneficial trade,
the corporations being by definition "local in character." For a full treatment, see
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
'See Walker 24-28.
'A recent study by the Boston Bar Association resulted in a recommendation
that service by registered mail be permitted as an alternative in purely local actions.
The study is briefly summarized in BOSTON B.J., Jan. 1968, at 5. Such a recom-
mendation by practitioners seemingly negates any argument that service by de-
livery to a designated agent is more convenient than service by mail.
222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
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plaintiffs brought suit against a Pennsylvania corporation to recover
damages for personal injuries suffered at the site of the defendant's -mining
operations in Pennsylvania. Service was' made in New York on an agent
designated by the defendant pursuant to the New York- toreign corpora-
tion law,' The defendant moved to set aside service, but this motion was
denied by Judge Learned Hand who held that the consent to service upon
the, designated agent was not limited to causes of action arising out of
the transaction of business by defendant in New York.
The New York Court of Appeals followed Judge Hand's decision
in Bagdon, v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,, an action against
the same corporate defendant, again by a New York plaintiff seeking to
recover for injuries suffered in Pennsylvania.- The New York court, in
an opinion by Judge Cardozo, held that service of process on the designated
agent was sufficient, though the cause of action did not arise out of business
transacted in the state.
In both cases the fact that a New York plaintiff was involved gave
some reason to adjudicate the claim in that state. The extreme fact situa-
tion, and the leading case, came a year later in 1917 when the Supreme
Court decided Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co.' An Arizona corporation brought an action in Missouri
against a Pennsylvania corporation to recover under the terms of a policy
insuring property located in Colorado. Defendant had designated, as
required,9 the Missouri Commissioner of Insurance as its local agent.
The suit was begun by service on the Commissioner, and the Missouri
Supreme Court held that the trial court thereby acquired jurisdiction over
defendant' 0 -although the cause of action arose outside the state and the
only contact either party had with Missouri was that defendant had named
a local agent. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, held
as a matter of due process that such designation could confer unlimited
general jurisdiction."
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman suggest in their
recent book that, in deciding whether a forum is appropriate, considera-
tion should be given to whether the proposed forum is justified in acting
'Act of Feb. 17, 1909, ch. 28, § 16, [1909] N.Y. Laws 15, printed at N.Y. CONS.
LAws 1985 (1909).
1217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916).
p243 U.S. 93 (1917).
'Act of March 24, 1885, [1885] Mo. Laws 183.
10 Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 267 Mo. 524,
184 S.W. 999 (1916).
211243 U.S. at 95-96.
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with respect to the parties involved, whether the underlying controversy
can properly be decided, and whether the prospective litigation can be
conveniently and effectively handled.12 A Missouri action between Pennsyl-
vania and Arizona corporations involving property located in Colorado
allowed on the sole basis of designation of a Missouri agent fails under
all three tests.
In his Gold Issue Mining opinion, Justice Holmes distinguished two
earlier cases, Old Wayne MWlutual Life Association v. McDonough 13 and
Simon v. Southern Railway,4 which held that service of process upon a
statutory agent was not sufficient as to causes of action arising outside
forum states. Justice Holmes noted that "in the above mentioned suits the
corporations had been doing business in certain States without authority"
and that "they had not appointed the agent as required by statute, and
it was held that service upon the agent whom they should have appointed
was ineffective upon causes arising in other States."'I5 He considered the
case of service upon a designated agent "untouched"'" by the precedent.
The distinction was unfortunate because it exposed corporations com-
plying with foreign corporation laws to suits in forums with little or no
interest in the subject matter but protected non-complying corporations.
This anomaly continues. Section 29 of the Restatement of Jutdgnznts'1
provides that a court may acquire jurisdiction by service of process on
an authorized agent, and comment b to section 29 states that the extent
of the authority "may be interpreted to extend to all causes of action
brought against the Corporation in the State....",x Section 30 states that
by proper service of process a court may acquire jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation doing business in the state as to causes of action arising out
of such business. A caveat immediately following states that no opinion
is expressed "on the question whether a court acquires jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation on the ground that it does business in the state
where the cause of action does not arise out of such business."' The Re-
statement lends support to the wrong rule in both cases. Where an agent
is designated, the suggestion is that non-related causes of action may
"A. v0N MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 631-
33 (1965).
1-204 U.S. 8 (1907).
1'236 U.S. 115 (1915).
:1243 U.S. at 95-96.
1
"Id. at 96.
'RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 29-30 (1942).
'* Id. § 29, comment b at 122.21 Id. § 30 at 123.
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properly be adjudicated. Where there is no appointment, but the corpora-
ton is doing business in the state, the Restatement invites adjudication
of non-related causes of action contrary to the small measure of common
sense left by the McDonough and Simon. cases. The rule suggested by
Justice Holmes has reached such a level of general acceptance that an
A.L.R. annotator wrote that the weight of authority holds that service
upon a designated agent will sustain jurisdiction although the transaction
giving rise to the cause of action occurred "beyond the territorial limits
of the state of suit.
2 0
Typical of the possibilities for abuse is Quigly Co. v. Asbestos Ltd.2
A New York corporation brought suit in New Jersey against another New
York corporation on a contract between the parties executed in New York
and bearing no substantive relation to New Jersey. The defendant had
complied previously with the requirements of New Jersey's foreign corpo-
ration law22 and had appointed an agent for service of process. A motion
to dismiss was denied despite affidavits showing that witnesses, records,
and other evidence necessary to determine the claim were located in New
York and that the defendant knew of no reason why the action could not
be brought in that state. The New Jersey Court held:
[C]ompliance with the statutory condition is not to be construed as de-
fendant's consent to be sued in our court only in particular causes of
action, but as a prerequisite required of it that, for the privilege of
coming in our borders and doing business herein, it should submit itself
to our courts in all causes of action over which our courts assume
jurisdiction.2
The draftsmen of the recently adopted New York Business Corpora-
tion Law24 recognized the need for limitations on the exercise of juris-
diction over foreign corporations but failed to meet that need. Section
1314 of the statute carefully defines certain situations in which actions
brought by non-resident plaintiffs against foreign corporations will be
allowed in New York courts. This approach is sound, but included among
the situations is "where the defendant is a foreign corporation doing
business in this state" 25 -an invitation to entertain actions such as those
rejected by McDonough and Simon. Matters were made worse by an
,
0Annot., 96 A.L.R. 366, 368 (1935).
21 134 N.J. Eq. 312, 35 A.2d 432, aff'd, 135 N.J. Eq. 460, 39 A.2d 135 (1944).
"N.J. REV. STAT. 14:15-1 to -10 (1937).28 134 N.J. Eq. at 315, 35 A.2d at 434.
2,The effective date of the Business Corporation Law was September 1, 1963.
Explanation to N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAW at III (McKinney 1963).
2.Id. § 1314(5).
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amendment in 1965 that substituted for the language above the words
"where the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business or authorized
to do business in this state."26 The italicized phrase in effect added the
assertion that New York is interested in adjudicating cases purely be-
cause of compliance with its foreign corporation law-much the same
situation as in the Gold Issue Mining case where the action was allowed
though the only forum contact was compliance with a designation require-
ment,
Thus foreign corporation laws and their agent requirements have en-
couraged inappropriate expansions of unlimited general jurisdiction and
have discouraged worthwhile analysis of the desirability of asserting
jurisdiction in particular cases.
B. Charter Copies
More than forty states today require foreign corporations to file copies
of their charters or articles of incorporation. The chief purpose of these
requirements was to protect local creditors from ultra vires acts by foreign
corporations, but this role has largely'been'taken over by other, more
effective legislation2,
The disclosure value of modern corporate charters is very limited-
they generally contair little more than the corporations' names, their
business purposes, the addresses of their principal offices, and the names
of their incorporators.2" Many states also require information about
capital structures and related matters, useful perhaps to stockholders, but
revealing almost nothing about ability to pay current debts."0 Few busi-
nessmen or lawyers would prefer charters to typical credit reports, and
few would ask to see charters in addition to such reports.
At one time New Hampshire was the only state that did not require the
filing of charters,30 but during the last ten years a number of states
20 N.Y. Bus. Coiu. LAW § 1314(5) (McKinney Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
" See Walker 21, 28-29.
"
8See R. .BAKER & W. CARY, CORPORATIoNs 23-27 (3rd ed. unabr. 1959) ; ABA-
ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 48 (1966).
" Local investors might benefit from enforcement of the reporting requirements
of foreign coiporation laws, but such benefit would be unintended. There is a
nationwide state mechanism designed to protect local investors. See L. Loss & B.
CowEr, BLUE SxY LAW (1958).
20 Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 363, 398 n.238 (1958). Dean Latty noted the elimination
of the requirement in New York and Pennsylvania and said that the requirement
"probably serves no useftil.practical purpose, despite theoretical arguments to the
contrary, and this break with the past is probably justified." Id. at 398.
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have eliminated the requirement. Unfortunately, most of those states now
ask that certificates of good standing issued by appropriate officers of states
of incorporation be filed."1 These bare statements that organizations pur-
porting to be corporations are in fact incorporated have little disclosure
value. If the fact of incorporation itself were important, few lawyers would
rely on a certificate filed as required; most Would insist on having fresh
evidence of good standing. But the repeal of some charter copy require-
ments is nevertheless important because it shows legislative recognition
that the utility of the requirements is spent.
Provisions that foreign corporations designate agents and file copies
of their charters are the only requirements adopted by all or most of the
states. Other common requirements have been enacted by a bare majority,
or less, of the states. The fact that a large number of states get along
without them creates a threshold question as to their utility.
C. Grants of Power and Subjections to Local Law
Some thirty states grant foreign corporations, upon compliance with
local statutes, the powers vested by law in domestic corporations, and
about the same number provide that corporations complying with the
statutes will be subject to local laws. 2 The grants of powers and sub-
jections to local law are usually linked in the acts. Grants of power need
little discussion. The result could be reached by appropriate recognition
of the law of incorporating jurisdictions, a process no more unusual than,
for example, recognition of foreign law in a tort action where called for
by conflict of laws principles.
The subjection provisions, in effect choice of law rules, require more
consideration. Couris 'can apply local law in actions involving foreign
corporations without' statutory auihorization, 'just as they can apply local
law in other actions though they involve some out-of-state element.33 The
statutory rules are clearly unnecessary. The rules do not apply, typically,
to all cases involving foreign corporations, but only to those involing
complying corporations. They come into effect ,upoh establishment of
certain legal relationships, although there is not, of necessity, a link be-
"E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corn,. LAW § 1304 (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§2004 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.585 (1968); Onio R.-CoDE § 1703.04
(Page 1964).
" See Walker 21.
"See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L.
REv. 433, 460 (1968).
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tween facts which bring about those relationships and the individual
and state interests that particular cases may involve.
Citations to these rules are rare, despite their widespread adoption,
perhaps because statutes are an unexpected source of choice of law rules.
But their potential for mischief is clear. In Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co.,
3 4
suit was brought in Montana in 1932 by a Montana resident seeking to
recover on an insurance policy issued by the defendant Iowa corporation.
In 1931 the defendant had been dissolved by a court order in Iowa in an
action brought by the Insurance Commissioner of that state. The Montana
litigation presented the question whether an action could be brought in
Montana against a foreign corporation previously dissolved by its state
of incorporation. The Montana court referrd first to a local statute which
provided that as to domestic corporations dissolution would not "impair
any remedy given against such corporation... for any liability which has
been previously incurred,"35 and then to the local foreign corporation law,
which provided that "all foreign corporations licensed to do business in
the State of Montana shall be subject to all the liabilities, restrictions and
duties which are or may be imposed upon corporations of like character
organized under the laws of this State. . .. "I The court read the two
statutes together and held that "when the surety company was licensed to
do business in the state of Montana, it became subject to the liabilities
and restrictions then imposed upon corporations of like character organized
under the laws of this state."37
The technique by which the choice of law issue was decided in Ml/ieyr
shows the potential for undesirable application of such broad statutory
rules. The opinion did not consider the interest and expectations of the
parties, the state policies involved, or even such traditional considerations as
the location of significant events.3" The court determined only that the legal
relationship existed and then moved immediately to its conclusion.
Occasionally, where there is no statutory rule, the fact of qualification
"94 Mont. 508, 23 P.2d 959 (1933), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Clark v.
Willard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934).
35 94 Mont. at 519, 23 P.2d at 962, quoting MONT. REV. CoDES ANN. § 6013
(1921).
" 94 Mont. at 521, 23 P.2d at 963, quoting MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 6659
(1921).
" 94 Mont. at 521, 23 P.2d at 963.
" For a sample of modem thinking about what courts should consider in re-
solving choice of law problems, see A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, TIlE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76-79 (1965); D. CAVERS, TmE Cuoicu oF LAW PROCESS
139-224 (1965).
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is nevertheless given considerable weight in deciding choice of law ques-
tions. In Dr. Hess & Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts Corp.,3 9 defendant Metal-
salts moved to dismiss as to its codefendant, Metalorganics, on the ground
that Metalorganics was an Illinois corporation that had been properly
dissolved more than two years earlier and that under Illinois law no action
could be brought against a dissolved corporation more than two years
after dissolution. The district court applied New Jersey law, which in-
definitely preserved actions against dissolved corporations, and denied the
motion. The court attached great significance to the fact of qualification:
"Metalorganics applied for and received authorization to do business in
the State of New Jersey, subjecting itself to such regulations as that state
saw fit to impose as incident to that privilege."4 ° The undue concern
with the fact of qualification obviously distracted the court from proper
analysis of the party and state interests involved.
The choice of law problems created by foreign corporation laws have
been recognized. About half the states with choice of law rules disclaim
an intention to regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations.4 1
This introduces some much needed flexibility, but application problems
remain. The innovations of the New York Business Corporation Law
suggest a better solution. Section 1319 lists by section number and descrip-
tion the provisions of the Business Corporation Act that will apply "to a
foreign corporation doing business in this state, its directors, officers, and
shareholders. 42 Section 1320 exempts from the operation of certain of
the sections listed in section 1319 corporations falling into either of two
categories: (1) corporations with shares listed on national securities ex-
changes and (2) corporations with less than one-half of their business
incomes allocable to New York for franchise tax assessments. Thus, by
selecting specific statutory provisions to apply to foreign corporations and
by exempting certain types of corporations from some of those sections,
New York has attempted in a rational way to solve choice of law problems
relating to foreign corporations.4 3 Its statute is a marked improvement
over broad, nonselective statutes, but whether any statute can be really
useful is open to question.
'* 119 F. Supp. 427 (D.N.J. 1954).
,
0 Id. at 428.
"E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.103 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2001
(1967).
"N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1319(a) (McKinney 1963).
" The New York choice of law scheme hopefully will not be shifted to turn on
compliance-as happened with the jurisdictional aspects of the foreign corporation
provisions. See pp. 737-38 supra.
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D. Name Restrictions
A bare majority of the states restrict the local use of certain names
by foreign corporations.14 Residents, of course, need protection from the
confusion and deception that can result from use of a corporate name
already claimed locally. Particularly in need of relief are the domestic
corporations that suffer when their names are associated with the shoddy
business practices of foreign corporations with similar names. But suffi-
cient protection already exists without the restrictions included in the
foreign corporation laws.
The right of local corporations to protect their names has long been
established.4 5 In American Clay Manufacturing Co. v. American Clay
Manufacturing Co.,46 a Pennsylvania corporation brought an action
against a New Jersey corporation to enjoin the use by the defendant of
plaintiff's name in Pennsylvania. The defendant argued that since it had
complied with the foreign corporation law of Pennsylvania, which imposed
no name restrictions, none could be imposed by the court. The court
rejected this argument, stating there was "no good reason why the mere
absence of a statutory provision as to foreign corporations coming into
this state to do business, should oust the courts of equity from their general
jurisdiction over the subject, which is exercised independently of stat-
ute."24
7
E. Names and Addresses of Principals
A substantial number of states require foreign corporations to file the
names and addresses of their officers and, occasionally, their directors.
It is desirable to know the names and residences of persons managing out-
of-state businesses if major transactions are planned.4' The information
can, of course, be gotten directly from the corporations. But here, more
than with most requirements, it is possible to recognize some local benefit
-though it is difficult to imagine any situation likely to recur in which
the local availability of names and addresses would be of critical impor-
tance. The possible value should be recognized and the question reserved
whether such minimal utility justifies foreign corporation law schemes.
"See Walker 21.
' To this effect see the collection of cases at Annot., 66 A.L.R. 948, 952-53
(1930).
' 198 Pa. 189, 47 A. 936 (1901).
47 Id. at 196, 47 A. at 937.
"S See Walker 20.
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F. Withdrawals and Revocations
Administrative provisions establishing the mechanics of withdrawal
by foreign corporations admitted to do business and the procedures for
revocation of that authority by the states serve only to support the sub-
stantive requirements of the laws. As such they have no utility themselves,
but nevertheless figure in any assessment of the general utility of the laws
because of the burdens they impose.
G. Annual Reports
A number of states require annual reports by foreign corporations.
The usefulness of these reports must be judged with respect to their two
traditional functions, providing information and facilitating state taxation
of foreign corporations.
1. Administrative Aspects
Some thirty states require foreign corporations to file annual reports
typically designed to bring up-to-date the information originally supplied.
A small minority asks for current financial data,49 but whether the benefits
of such data outweigh the increased burden is doubtful. The significant
fact here is that only a handful of states request this information. Thus
the reports must be mainly regarded as support provisions which can be
justified only by reference to the positive features of the laws.
2. Tax Aspects
An evaluation of annual report requirements must take into account
their relationship, and, indeed, the relationship of foreign corporation laws,
to state tax programs. 0
Capital stock taxes are levied under a number of names such as corpo-
ration franchise tax, corporation license tax or corporation business tax.
All are annually recurring taxes assessed according to the value of a
corporation's capital. The tax base is determined either from the corpora-
tion's statement of capital, a so-called capital account base, or in some
'O Id. at 22.
"' The basic source material for the following discussion is the excellent report
of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 3 SPECIAL
SUBCOmm. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HousE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No.
565, 89th Cong., Ist. Sess. 925 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL SUBCOMM.
REPORT]. The report drew from the thoughts of leading scholars in the field and
from a wide collection of empirical data. Specific references are cited as appropriate.
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more realistic manner attempting to reflect the value of the business enter-
prise, usually called a capital value base.
Capital stock taxes are imposed by some thirty-six states of which more
than twenty-five make the levy applicable to out-of-state corporations. At
one time the tax was a significant source of state revenue, but by 1963 it
accounted on the average for little more than three percent of the revenue
of states that used it and is now only a minor source of state income.51
At least twenty-two of the states that impose a capital stock tax on
foreign corporations impose the tax solely on the basis of compliance with
foreign corporation laws. In some cases this result is called for by
statute.5" The Model Act provides that "the Secretary of State shall
charge and collect from each foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in this state an annual franchise tax. ' 5 3 In other states, essentially
the same result is reached because of administrative reliance on the fact of
compliance. The House of Representatives' Special Subcommittee on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce reported:
In a number of States, the tax administrators clearly make no attempt
to determine jurisdiction on the basis of any pattern of activity within
the State. In nine States . .. the administrators explained that the
question for them was simply whether the company was qualified.54
The ties between capital stock taxes and foreign corporation laws
cannot be explained by history. The early foreign corporation statutes were
enacted to meet needs unrelated to capital stock taxes or other state tax
programs." This conclusion does not, of course, determine the value of
the present relationships where they exist; but it brings into question
any suggestion that such relationships are inevitable. The ties, whether
statutory or administrative, probably developed because both assessment
of capital stock taxes and administration of foreign corporation laws are
usually the responsibility of the same state executive officers, usually called
the Secretary of State. No doubt these officers found it inconvenient to
make separate determinations as to whether out-of-state corporations were
subject to the capital stock taxes and whether they were required to comply
51 SPECIAL SUBCOmm. REPORT 903-17. The data as to the number of states im-
posing the tax was collected in 1964.
"' E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 84-1833 (1947) ("qualified under the laws of this
State"); S.C. CODE § 65-602 (1962), as amended (Supp. 1968) ("qualified to do
business").
1 1ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 126 (1966).
"SPECIAL SUBco-,wm. REPORT 934.
' See Walker 2-19.
[Vol. 47
FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
with foreign corporation laws, and began as an administrative matter to
decide the issues as one question.
Taxes imposed solely because of compliance are levied without refer-
ence to local economic activity. While it is true that qualification may
co-exist with significant local activities, it is also true that the relationship
may exist where no local business is done at all.56 Moreover, the authority
upon which businessmen, and their accountants and lawyers, must rely in
determining liability for capital stock taxes is developed in a context un-
related to taxation. Most appellate decisions involving foreign corpora-
tion laws result from refusals by state courts to allow suits by foreign
corporations against local defendants. The results are difficult to rationalize
but nevertheless must function as guides for private determinations of
tax liability.
These problems were recognized by the Special Subcommittee, which
recommended that capital stock taxes and foreign corporation laws be
separated: "While recognizing that the privilege of doing business in
corporate form within a State has long been considered a suitable subject
for the levy of a tax, it may be suggested that both the taxing and regula-
tory functions would operate more effectively if their incidence were
separated." 7
Recent changes in the law also suggest that the present system causes
considerable inconvenience for state administrators. In 1951 the Supreme
Court decided in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor" that a tax on
the privilege of doing business could not be levied where the business was
entirely in interstate commerce. Eight years later, however, the Court
held in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota59 that
the net income of a foreign corporation derived solely from interstate
commerce was a proper subject of state taxation. 0 The practical effect of
these two decisions is to allow state income taxes to be imposed on foreign
" Apportionment formulas do, however, often supply some economic reality,
considerably improving the practical result if not the logic of the levy. As the
Special Subcommittee pointed out, use of of the legal relationship test can lead,
under typical apportionment formulas, to situations in which returns are required
although there are no tax bases. "[T]here are reasons for a company qualifying
to do business in a State where it presently neither has any activity or sales."
SPECIAL SUBCOMm. REPORT 992.571 d. at 991.
C340 U.S. 602 (1951).
°358 U.S. 450 (1959).0oFor a concise survey of these developments, see W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES
TO OTHER STATES 2.1-2.25 (1963).
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corporations at a level of contact considerably lower than the level required
to allow taxation of the privilege of doing business locally, the subject
upon which most capital stock taxes are levied.
Spector and Northwestern are open to the criticism that they created
an artificial distinction between the two schemes of taxation. But the dis-
tinction remains; its effect is that states that subject out-of-state corpo-
rations to taxes on net income and capital stock taxes on the privilege
of doing a local business take two tax bites at different degrees of local
contact. Income tax liability attaches first at a minimal level, and then
when there are considerably more contacts capital stock taxes may be
imposed. Two administrative judgments are required if the case law is
conscientiously followed.
At least five states apparently have recognized some of these problems
and now integrate capital stock taxes into their income taxes."' The com-
plete integration of capital stock taxes into income tax programs is de-
sirable, particularly from the viewpoint of state officials.
The suggestion is sometimes made that annual reports serve as sig-
nificant sources of information for officials enforcing other state tax laws.
Presumably this suggestion is directed to enforcement of state income
and sales and use tax laws-typically the major sources of revenue from
foreign corporations.
This suggested utility is subject to two criticisms. First, the North-
western case in the income tax area and Miller Brothers v. Maryland0 2
and Scripto Inc. v. Carson13 in the sales tax field clearly permit states to
require foreign corporations to pay taxes on their net incomes and to
collect sales or use taxes in cases where the degree of local contact is
considerably lower than that required by the Constitution for application of
foreign corporation laws. 4 The existence of these different thresholds
typically means that information comes to state tax officials because of
compliance with foreign corporation laws only after considerably more
local contact than is necessary to create liabilities for income and sales
and use taxes. Enforcement difficulties come in large part where contacts
are minimal and tax liabilities arguable, a situation in which corporations
usually are not required to qualify. A second criticism is that state tax
laws typically impose independent reporting requirements on foreign
o1SPEciAL Stmfcomm. REPORT 932.
"347 U.S. 340 (1954).
.°: 362,U.S..207 (1960).
i" See pp. 747-53 infra.
[Vol. 47
FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
corporations without reference to foreign corporation laws.65 The differ-
ent contact thresholds explain why this must be so; no doubt officials con-
cerned with the enforcement of tax laws prefer to tailor reporting require-
ments to fit their particular needs. Even as a cross check, information
supplied pursuant to foreign corporation laws is of little value. Corpora-
tions that fail to pay income or sales and use taxes but have sufficient
local contacts to require compliance with foreign corporation laws are not
likely to comply.
Practical analysis, even speculation, thus indicates that at most foreign
corporation laws are of minimal value today. The original reason for the
laws has not been replaced by a significant new purpose that now justifies
this expanding and complex regulatory scheme.
II. JUDICIAL SOLUTION
One solution to the problem of aimless regulation presented by foreign
corporation laws could come from an examination by the courts of the im-
pact of these laws on the national market. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
would have to decide the constitutional issues that would be presented.
Suggestions about the technique and substance of such a decision must
begin with an analysis of the Court's work to date.
A. Supreme Court Cases
Apparently, Cooper Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson66 is the earliest
case in which the Supreme Court considered the effect of the com-
merce clause on the application of a foreign corporation law. An Ohio
corporation brought suit in a Colorado federal court to recover damages
from the Colorado defendants for breach of a contract to purchase a
steam engine. The plaintiff's agreement to sell the engine was its only
business venture in the state. The defendants claimed that the contract was
void because, at the time it was executed in Colorado, the plaintiff had
not complied with the Colorado foreign corporation law.67 The Supreme
Court held that under the Colorado statute a single business transaction
was not sufficient business activity to require compliance. The Court ex-
pressly stated that it did "not find it necessary to decide" whether the
"E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102 (1961), as amended (Supp. 1968) (imposing
income tax) ; Id. § 92-3202 (1961) (establishing reporting requirement); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 3420c (1964) (imposing income'tax); Id. § 3420d (establishing
reporting requirement).
08113 U.S. 727 (1885).
'
7 Act of March 14, 1877, § 23, printed at CoLO. GEN. LAWS 151 (1877).
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provisions of the Act "invade the exclusive right of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several States. s But Justices Matthews and Blatch-
ford concurred on the ground that the power of a state to regulate local
business "cannot be admitted to extend so far as to prohibit or regulate
commerce among the States; for that would be to invade the jurisdiction
which, by the terms of the Constitution of the United States, is conferred
exclusively upon Congress." 9
In 1899, Kansas enacted a complex foreign corporation law,70 and
within a relatively brief period it went before the Supreme Court four
times. In the first two cases, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas1
and Pullman Co. v. Kansas,"2 Kansas attempted to prevent the corpora-
tions involved from transacting further business in the state because of
their failure to pay fees of one-tenth of one per cent of their authorized
capital. The fee requirements were part of the Kansas foreign corporation
law, but the court treated both cases as tax matters and held that the
fees could not be levied, primarily because there was no apportionment
provision and thus no attempt to relate the amount of the fee to the
local activities of the corporations.
The statute was considered a third time in 1909 in International Text-
book Co. v. Pigg.73 A Pennsylvania corporation sued in Kansas to recover
money due under a contract for correspondence courses. The contract was
executed in Kansas by the Kansas defendant and was forwarded to Pennsyl-
vania where it was accepted by the plaintiff. The defendant did not deny
making the contract or that he was indebted to the plaintiff but maintained
that the plaintiff had not complied with the Kansas foreign corporation
law and thus could not sue in the Kansas courts. The Supreme Court
reached the commerce question after deciding that the Kansas statute
required compliance. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court and stated the
following constitutional test:
But this view as to the meaning of the Kansas statute does not neces-
cessarily lead to an affirmance of the judgment below if, as the plaintiff
contends, the business in which it is regularly engaged is interstate in
its nature, and if the statute, by its necessary operation, materially or
directly burdens that business.74
8 113 U.S. at 735-36.
"Id. at 736.Act of Jan. 7, 1899, ch. 10, § 2, [1898] Kan. Laws Spec. Sess. 27-28.
'216 U.S. 1 (1910).
S'216 U.S. 56 (1910).
217 U.S. 91 (1910).
• Id. at 105-06.
[Vol. 47
FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
Justice Harlan turned to the plaintiff's business operations and considered
in detail the method by which correspondence courses were carried on,
concluding that the plaintiff's business was interstate. The Court then
examined the requirements of the statute, particularly the requirement of
annual reports, and decided that "the statute imposes a direct burden on the
plaintiff's right to engage in interstate business, and, therefore, is in viola-
tion of its constitutional rights."7
Pigg was followed that same year in International Textbook Co. v.
Lynch 7 involving the Vermont foreign corporation act7 7 and in Interna-
tional Textbook Co. v. Petersoz8 involving the Wisconsin law.7" The
Kansas statute came before the Supreme Court for the fourth time in
Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers s° and the Court applied the Pigg
holding without elaboration.
In Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope,"' an Iowa corporation sued in South
Dakota to recover the purchase price of merchandise sold to the South
Dakota defendant, but the action was dismissed on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to comply with the South Dakota foreign corporation
law." The Supreme Court asked first whether the foreign corporation
act had been applied to interstate commerce and, if so, whether it im-
posed a burden on that commerce. The first question was conceded, and
the Court quickly found that the act imposed a considerable burden and
reversed.
The same technique was followed in Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant. The plantiff, a Tennessee corporation, brought an action
against a Kentucky resident to recover damages for breach of a contract
to sell wheat grown on the defendant's farm. The trial court directed a
verdict for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied
with the Kentucky foreign corporation law," and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed. s5 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the trans-
"Id. at 112.
7-218 U.S. 664 (1910) (per curiam).
"Act of Dec. 16, 1902, no. 20, §§ 59-64, [1902] Vt. Laws 29-31.
7-218 U.S. 664 (1910) (per curiam).
"Act of June 20, 1905, ch. 506, [1905] Wis. Laws 932.80226 U.S. 205 (1912).
81235 U.S. 197 (1914).
"Act of March 14, 1895, ch. 47, [1895] S.D. Laws 52.80257 U.S. 282 (1921).
8 Act of April 5, 1893, ch. 171, §§ 34-35, [1891-93] Ky. Laws 625-26.
8 Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 185 Ky. 386, 215 S.W. 76 (1919).
The Kentucky court's reasons are set out in an earlier opinion in 1he same case.
Bondurant v. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co., 175 Ky. 774, 195 S.W. 139 (1917).
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action was a part of interstate commerce" and that the statute "conceded-
ly imposed burdensome conditions.""0 The Arkansas law87 came before
the Court in Furst & Thomas v. Brewster.8 The Illinois plaintiffs sued
in Arkansas to recover for goods sold to the Arkansas defendants. The
defendants asserted that the action could not be brought in the Arkansas
courts because the plaintiffs acted in securing the contract of sale as agents
for an Illinois corporation that had not complied with the Arkansas foreign
corporation law. The Supreme Court examined the plaintiff's business,
found that the contract sued upon "constituted interstate commerce," 89
and held that the suit must be allowed.
Just as the tide of purpose began to run out of foreign corporation laws
the Supreme Court curiously changed its direction. Union Brokerage Co.
v. Jensen90 involved the Minnesota foreign corporation law,9' though in
the confusing circumstance of an enterprise subject to considerable federal
regulation. The plaintiff was a North Dakota corporation engaged in the
business of customhouse brokerage, securing the entry of goods from
Canada into the United States. It brought suit in Minnesota against the
Minnesota defendants for breach of fiduciary obligations. The only defense
was that the plaintiff had not complied with the Minnesota foreign corpo-
ration law. In his opinion for the Court Justice Frankfurter dealt ex-
tensively with the issues raised by Congressional action in the customs
field and concluded that the federal regulatory scheme did not preclude
enforcement of the Minnesota law. Although the plaintiff's business was
"related to the process of foreign commerce,"92 he found that it had become
so "localized" as to be subject to state supervision." Following the old
test, Justice Frankfurter then asked whether the Minnesota law was a bur-
den on this localized but foreign commerce. He first decided the law was a
"supervisory and not a fiscal measure,"94 but in estimating its effect, he
treated the law as a tax scheme and wrote that "[b]y its own force that
Clause does not imply relief to those engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce from the duty of paying an appropriate share for the main-
257 U.S. at 292-93.
Act of May 13, 1907, no. 313, [1907] Ark. Laws 744.88282 U.S. 493 (1931).
o Id. at 497.0322 U.S. 202 (1944).
81Act of April 20, 1935, ch. 200, [1935] Minn. 369.
99 322 U.S. at 209.
831d. at 211.
9 Id. at 210.
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tenance of the various state governments."95 The opinion adds little to
the technique of Pigg. Justice Frankfurter did not discuss the purpose
of the Minnesota law and found it not to be a burden, though the earlier
cases suggested the contrary. The significant aspect is the result: for the
first time application of a foreign corporation law was upheld by the
Supreme Court.
In 1961 the Court decided Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, .Lnc., 96
its most recent case in the field. An Indiana corporation sued in New
Jersey to enjoin the defendant, a New Jersey corporation, from selling
merchandise at prices lower than those fixed by minimum resale price
contracts that the plaintiff had entered with a number of other New Jersey
retailers.97 The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiff had not complied with the New Jersey foreign corporation law.98
Both parties submitted affidavits on the nature of the plaintiff's New Jersey
business. The trial court dismissed99 and the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed.'0 0 The Supreme Court affirmed in a five-to-four decision, one
Justice concurring specially. The opinion of the Court by Justice Black
adopted the Pigg test without question:
It is well established that New Jersey cannot require Lilly to get a cer-
tificate of authority to do business in the State if its participation in this
trade is limited to its wholly interstate sales to New Jersey whole-
salers .... On the other hand, it is equally well settled that if Lilly
is engaged in intrastate as well as interstate aspects of the New Jersey
drug business, the State can require it to get a certificate of authority
to do business. 10 1
Justice Black examined the evidence relating to the plaintiff's New Jersey
operations and concluded that Lilly was engaged in intrastate commerce
and that the foreign corporation law could constitutionally be applied.
There was no mention of the requirements or the purposes of the act.10 2
or Id. at 212.00366 U.S. 276 (1961).
Defendant did not sign such an agreement but, according to N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 56:4-6 (1937), non-signers with notice were bound to observe minimum contract
prices.
"N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 14:15-1 to -10 (1937).
"Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 57 N.J. Super. 291, 154 A.2d 650
(1959).
.00 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 31 N.J. 591, 158 A.2d 528 (1960).
101 366 U.S. at 278-79.
102 Counsel for Lilly questioned the interest of New Jersey in applying its foreign
corporation law. Brief for Apellant at 21-25. New Jersey replied that it had a
"legitimate right to know generally who a corporation is, whether it intends to
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Even the traditional consideration of the burden imposed by the state law
was omitted as unnecessary after a finding that the plaintiff was involved
in intrastate commerce.
Justice Harlan concurred, adding some further commerce distinctions.
Justice Douglas, in a dissent joined by Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker,
and Stewart, discussed the case upon the stated assumption that plaintiff
was doing an interstate business. Justice Douglas suggested no new rule
but followed his assumption to a conclusion contrary to that of the major-
ity. The main contribution of the dissent was its recognition that the de-
cision "provides the formula whereby a State can stand over the channels
of interstate commerce in a way that promises to do great harm to the
national market that heretofore the Commerce Clause has protected."1 '
The relation of foreign corporation laws and the commerce clause has
not since been before the Court, but in 1964 an application of the Alabama
act 10 4 was considered in NAACP v. Alabanza.0 ' The Attorney General
of Alabama sued to oust the NAACP, a New York corporation, on the
ground that it had not complied with the act. The Court found that since
act lawfully and in accordance with New Jersey laws, and whether it will be subject
to process here." Brief of Intervenor-Appellee at 12. The Court's opinion ignored
the exchange.
103 366 U.S. at 292. The Lilly case divided the law reviews much as it did the
Court. A writer at Yale had doubts about the result primarily because the Court's
hair splitting involved tax cases, particularly Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246
U.S. 147 (1918). Note, Corporate Registration: A Functionail Analysis of Do-
ing Business, 71 YALE L.J. 575 (1962). The writer questioned the utility of
statutes such as that involved, but failed to draw significant conclusions. Id. at
584-86. A Harvard writer was more sympathetic, apparently in part because "Lilly
is in keeping with the recent trend toward increased state power over foreign corpo-
rations." The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 139 (1961). The
interest of New Jersey was considered "strong enough to warrant a licensing re-
quirement" though the reasons given were that designation of agents can eliminate
by waiver litigation of Constitutional minimum contacts questions and that the pro-
visions have some unspecified "informational value to the state." Id. at 140. At the
extreme was a Cornell writer who suggested that the Court should hold that quali-
fication statutes can be applied where only interstate commerce is involved be-
cause typically the "benefits which accrue to a foreign corporation from conduct-
ing business within a state outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce effected by
such a statute." Note, State Regulation of Foreign Corporations: Qualification:
Interstate v. Intrastate Business, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 300, 308 (1962). The purpose
of the statutes and the state interests were ignored, distorting the limited effective-
ness of such a balancing test by in effect balancing the corporation only against
itself. For other comment see 40 TEx. L. REV. 717 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REV. 650(1962).
"" ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 192-98 (1959), as amended, §§ 21 (87)-(96) (Supp.
1967).
10 377 U.S. 288 (1963). The case was decided with reference to the Alabama
statute as it was prior to amendment. Id. at 304 & n.9.
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the Alabama statute did not provide for ouster upon noncompliance there
was no basis to oust defendant. In passing, the Court noted that "the
registration requirements are what they appear to be on their face... :
provisions ensuring that foreign corporations will be amenable to suit in
Alabama courts."' 06
B. Techniques
In Lilly, the Supreme Court approached the question of the consti-
tutionality of foreign corporation laws under the commerce clause in
essentially the same way that it had approached the question fifty years
earlier in Pigg. The Court still asked whether the business operations of
the foreign corporation were interstate or intrastate in character, notwith-
standing a Ross Prize essayist's observation six years earlier that "the
Court no longer applies what Chief Justice Stone termed the 'mechanical
test' whereby the validity of a state law depended on whether it regulated
interstate or intrastate transactions.'
1 0 7
The major failure of the mechanical test is that its result often turns
on trivial facts that bear no relationship to the policies expressed by the
commerce clause. In Lilly, for example, Justice Black carefully considered
evidence that the corporation's name was "on the door and in the lobby"'0 s
of a building in Newark, New Jersey. The decision apparently turned on
an analysis of the day-to-day activities in New Jersey of eighteen "detail-
men" employed by Lilly to visit pharmacists, physicians, and hospitals to
encourage the use of the corporation's products. These facts may have
been necessary to relate the case to the traditional test, but this suggests
only the irrationality of the old approach.
1. Economic Principles
A more satisfactory analysis of cases involving the application of
foreign corporation laws can be developed if it is understood that the
commerce clause is primarily a statement of economic policy. A detailed
examination of this view is beyond the scope of this article, but it is
desirable to discuss certain major principles that will figure later in a
suggested solution to the foreign corporation law problem.
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "to
regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
10 Id. at 305.
" 'Stem, The Scope of the Phrase "Interstate Commerce," 41 A.B.A.J. 823,
873-74 (1955). The language by Chief Justice Stone is from Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943).108 366 U.S. at 280.
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and with the Indian Tribes." 09 There is considerable historical data
clearly suggesting that one of the principle forces behind the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 was dissatisfaction with the chaos in interstate
business transactions" ° and that the commerce clause was an attempt to
solve these problems. In Gibbons v. Ogden,111 Chief Justice Marshall
suggested, but did not decide, that this power granted to Congress was
exclusive and that therefore all state power to regulate interstate com-
merce wast lost upon ratification. The Chief Justice drew back from the
suggestion of an exclusive commerce power five years later in Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co."2 where the court upheld a Delaware act
providing for the erection of a dam across a tidal creek. In Cooley v.
Board of Wardens,"3 the Court rejected a concept of the power as broadly
exclusive and began a long line of decisions attempting to sort out the
matters subject and not subject to state control. One group of these
decisions is strictly jurisdictional in approach and rests on the interstate-
intrastate distinction used in the foreign corporation law cases.
None of the opinions has effectively employed economic principles.
Chief justice Marshall moved in that direction in Gibbons v. Ogden when
he noted the desirability of commercial regulation constituting a "uniform
whole."" 4 A complete analysis, however, must ask why a uniform whole
is desirable, and broadly, what theoretical implications are included in
the founders' attempt to create a national market.
In 1776, Adam Smith expounded for the first time a modern theory
of economic specialization when, on the first page of his Wealth of Nations,
he extolled the benefits of a division of labor. Early trade theorists ex-
tended his theory to international trade. They reasoned that where a nation
enjoyed an absolute advantage in the production of certain commodities,
it was to its benefit to trade those commodities to other nations for
commodities that it produced at an absolute disadvantage.
David Ricardo refined the theory by pointing out that beneficial trade
could take place when the advantage was only relative, and not absolute.
A nation or region less efficient in the' production of all goods could
benefit, he wrote, by exporting the goods that it produced relatively or
... U.S. Coxsr. art. I, § 8.
110 For a survey of the materials, see Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Consti-
tutio l Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432 (1941).
11122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
11227 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
118 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
11,22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
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comparatively efficiently and importing the goods that it produced rela-
tively less efficiently. This theory of comparative advantage, out of which
grew a full understanding of international trade, is "a closely reasoned
doctrine which, when properly stated, is unassailable.""'
This theory of international trade has important social implications.
The effect of international trade is easily understood through the use
of a simple model such as that described by D. A. Snider in his Introduc-
tion To International Economics."6 The model quantitatively demon-
strates that the participating nations, will have a larger volume of all
goods from the employment of a given amount of resources than-would
be the case in economic isolation.11 7 Since the production of goods is ulti-
mately a social cost, increase in the volume of goods produced by the same
effort is a net social gain. Paul Samuelson makes it clear that these prin-
ciples of international trade are fully applicable within the United States:
From the standpoint of pure economic welfare, the slogan "Buy Ameri-
can" is as foolish as "Buy Wisconsin" would be or "Buy Oshkosh,
Wisconsin," or "Buy South Oshkosh, Wisconsin." Part of our great
prosperity comes from the fortunate fact that there are no restrictive
customs duties within our 50 states, which form one great free-trade
area.
1 8
Arguably then, the commerce clause is not a jurisdictional device to divide
the areas of federal and state economic action; it incorporates very practical
economic principles that have the capacity to maximize the social well-
being of the entire nation.
2. Balance of Interests
Direct reference to the principles of another discipline is still a radical
step for the courts. A traditional, yet improved, method of analysis is also
available for the foreign corporation law problem.
1. P. SAMUELSON, ECONoMics 646 (7th ed. 1967). Pages 646-702 of this text
are one of two basic sources for this discussion. The other is D. SNIDER, INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics (4th ed. 1967). A note of appreciation for
generous advice is here due Dr. Richard Musgrave, Professor of Economics in the
Faculty of Arts and Sciences and in the Law School of Harvard University.
11 D. SNIDER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIcs 29-56 (4th ed.
1967).
... The writers of the mercantilistic era, suggesting that one country's gain must
be the other's loss, came to the opposite conclusion. This era ended about 1750.
Id. at 54. It may prove too much to say that the adoption of the commerce clause
was a conscious rejection of the old theory and a turn toward the new, but the
possibility is interesting.
... P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 666 (7th ed. 1967).
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In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,n" the state attempted to enforce
against the defendant railroad the provisions of a train limit law,120 which
made it unlawful to operate a train of more than a stated number of cars.
The Court found that Congressional activity had not closed the field
to state legislation and thereby reached the commerce question. After
a brief review of early decisions, Chief Justice Stone suggested a test
that called first for determination of the "nature and extent of the burden
which the state regulation" imposed, and then consideration of "the rela-
tive weights of the state and national interests involved.' 121 Applying this
test, the Chief Justice thoroughly analyzed the purposes and the effects of
the train limit statute and held that, as applied, it was in conflict with the
commerce clause. This brought consideration of the substance of state
regulation to the forefront and departed from a strictly jurisdictional
approach.22
Chief Justice Stone's use of empirical data in considering Arizona's
claim that the Train Limit Law was a safety measure and therefore a
matter of significant state interest is noteworthy. The persuasive con-
clusion was that the law caused more accidents than it prevented. The
Court said that "the Arizona Train Limit Law, viewed as a safety mea-
sure, affords at most slight and dubious advantage, if any, over unregulated
train lengths, because it results in an increase in the number of trains
and train operations and the consequent increase in train accidents of a
character generally more severe than those due to slack action."" This
fruitful inquiry by the Court would not have taken place if it had only
looked for interstate or intrastate commerce. Chief Justice Stone's balance
of interests tests could be equally revealing if applied to foreign corpora-
tion law problems.
C. Applications
The economic principles of the commerce clause can be applied to
suggest a judgment about foreign corporation laws and their impact
119 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The case is discussed in Stern, The Scope of the
Phrase "Interstate Commerce," 41 A.B.A.J. 823, 874 (1955).
... Act of May 16, 1912, ch. 43, [1912] Ariz. Laws 195.
121325 U.S. at 770.
12 In seeking to balance state and national interests, however, Justice Stone's
method incorporates and continues a basic fallacy of dual interests. The interest
in question is unitary and the commerce clause makes the Court not the arbiter of
competing demands, but the agent for maximizing that interest.
123 325 U.S. at 779. Slack action is the amount of free movement of one car
before it transmits its movement to the next, and was said to be the chief danger
diminished by train limit laws. Id. at 776.
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in particular cases. Models such as that used by Professor Snider to
demonstrate the benefits of trade12 1 identify the elements to be assembled
and their proper arrangement.
Compliance with state foreign corporation laws imposes a sizeable
financial burden on modern corporations with multi-state operations.
Some of the costs of compliance can be determined with some precision;
others are susceptible only to rough estimates. Examination of these
costs, however, does serve to illustrate the magnitude of the financial
burden.
Lawyers today rely heavily on the services of corporations organized
to assist others in compliance with foreign corporation laws. Local
attorneys are sometimes employed, but by and large the paper work is left
to service corporations. The Corporation Trust Company is the largest
of these companies and with its subsidiaries controls about half the
market. "' 5 The CT System, as the Corporation Trust Company calls its
service, operates in the qualification field by providing research data for
lawyers, furnishing work sheets for qualification, preparing and filing
applications, maintaining designated agents, and supplying further services
as required.
CT's chief research tool is a publication entitled What Constitutes
Doing Business, an unrivaled collection of the conflicting and obscure
decisions on the scope of foreign corporation laws. Information published
by the company for businessmen is doleful. Executives are invited to
write for booklets with titles such as: Some Contracts Have False Teeth;
Agent fcr Process; Heads I Win Tails You Lose; Corporate Confusion;
and A Pretty Penny.. . Gone.
The standard fee of the CT System is sixty dollars per qualification.
For an additional ten dollars CT will act as a desiganted agent for one
year. After the first year the agency fee is forty dollars annually if the
service is used in only one state, and thirty-five dollars per state if CT is
used in more than one state. The charge for filing an annual report is
fifteen dollars. Filing charter amendments costs fifteen dollars, but, where
a charter amendment requires an amended application, there is an addi-
tional fifteen-dollar charge. Withdrawal costs range from thirty-five
dollars to 100 dollars in states where the procedure is particularly difficult.
All out of pocket expenses are billed, a substantial item where publication
.., See p. 755 stpra.
121 Information about the operation and fees of the Corporation Trust Company
and its subsidiaries was furnished by a representative of its Boston office in 1968.
199
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is required. Charges are perfectly regressive. CT bills Ford Motor Com-
pany the same price per transaction that it charges a New York grocer
opening a fruit stand in Jersey City.
The fees of service corporations represent only a part of qualification
costs. Typically, lawyers must first decide whether to qualify and then
see that the procedures are properly completed. Legal fees in most cases
equal and probably exceed service corporation charges. The state filing
charges are additional costs. The amounts vary a great deal, but over the
nation they probably roughly equal service corporation fees. The most
difficult costs to estimate are the internal administrative costs of com-
pliance, such as expenditures for collection of the data necessary to
prepare applications and annual reports. Though not related to costs of
compliance, the potentially great expense of contract defaults should be
noted because they increase the costs of engaging in out-of-state business.
The general effect of these compliance expenses is to increase the cost of
doing business across state lines in much the same way that tariffs increase
the cost of doing an international business. The dollar amounts are not
large but they are significant in light of the type of business largely
affected. The Special Subcommittee reported in 1964 that the typical
interstate business is not a large corporation with heavy administrative
support. A majority of them are companies with less than one million
dollars in annual sales and about half have fewer than twenty employees.
Many have annual sales of less than $500,000 and fewer than ten em-
ployees. 126 The costs of qualification are a burden to these smaller busi-
nesses taking tentative steps toward expansion. While compliance costs
are not perfectly analogous to tariffs (for example, no tariff is perfectly
regressive), both tend to increase the price of traded goods to the pur-
chaser, a situation that entails the same economic consequences whether
the increase in price is occasioned by a tariff or by compliance costs.
The usual result of a tariff is that the price of the goods falls in the
exporting country and rises in the importing country. This price change
induces domestic producers in the importing country to produce more of
the affected goods and less of the specialty goods produced for interna-
tional trade. In the exporting country, the fall in prices tends to slow
down production of the local specialty and increase production of other
"1 SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sesi. 69-75 (1964). A summary of findings is at
74-75.
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less efficiently produced goods, just as occurred in the importing country.
The effect then of a tariff is to reduce the economic efficiency of both
the importing and exporting countries and, therefore, to reduce the sum
of social well-being.1
27
To this point the conclusion seems clear that since foreign corporation
laws increase the costs of out-of-state traders, and ultimately the price
of traded goods, the laws tend to restrict trade and should no longer
be enforced. But the problem can be more complex.
In the case of some kinds of regulation of out-of-state business-for
example, long arm statutes subjecting foreign corporations to suit on the
basis of minimal contacts 2s---this analysis which supposes only an in-
crease in the costs of the foreign trader is inaccurate. If local regulation
did not exist, the costs to local purchasers would be increased because
of a higher incidence of loss through unfair dealing; consequently, the
effect of abolishing the regulation in question might depress trade more
than the tariff effect created by the regulation.
The economist's solution in such a situation is to create a model of
the particular system and, by a series of tests involving first the elimina-
tion of one factor and then the other, to determine the separate effects of
each and thus accumulate the data necessary to make a judgment as
to whether the regulation or the lack of it produces the greatest social
good.129 Foreign corporation laws do not, however, present judgment
problems that require such sophisticated models. The laws are no longer
necessary to protect local residents; hence their abrogation would not
increase the cost of traded goods to local purchasers. Even if the statutes
were found to have some minimal utility, they should be abrogated be-
cause they tend to reduce trade which in turn diminishes the sum of social
well-being.
Application of the more traditional legal solution proposed by Chief
Justice Stone in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ° would reach the same
result. The burden of foreign corporation laws is considerable, as has been
indicated in the discussion above of the costs of compliance. The proper
solution of the balance of interests equation suggested by the Chief
2I D. SNIDER, INTRODUCTON TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 143-52 (4th ed.
1967).
"8 See Walker 27-28.
.2 The promise and the difficulty of using economic analysis in the solution of
particular cases is discussed in Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging
of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960).
1-0325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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Justice is also clear. Set on one side is the national interest in developing
and maintaining a maximum level of trade. This interest has traditionally
been accepted by the courts without proof, and the economic materials
show it to be stronger than most suspect. On the other side of the equation
is the near-zero utility of typical foreign corporation laws. Even some
minimal utility set against the national interest in Chief Justice Stone's
equation would not put the result in doubt. The statutory scheme, as
customarily applied, now conflicts with the commerce clause and therefore
should not be further enforced by the courts.
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The problem of foreign corporation laws is also susceptible to legisla-
tive solution. Many specific improvements could be made: broad choice
of law provisions could be carefully limited, local agent requirements could
include provisions limiting the jurisdiction of courts over cases begun by
service on such agents, and state tax programs could be separated from
foreign corporation laws.
Yet these changes could not infuse new purpose in the laws. The best
legislative solution would be to eliminate general foreign corporation
laws from current corporation codes; certainly no new code should be
adopted that includes the scheme. Such action would require, of course, a
preliminary analysis of local law, particularly long arm statutes and
corporate tax reporting requirements. The Uniform Interstate and Inter-
national Procedure Act provides a good standard for judging the ade-
quacy of long arm statutes and for drafting such a statute if that is
necessary. Reporting requirements need only state the requirement and
relate it to tax liability. The Georgia statute requiring income tax re-
turns is an example of the simplicity of an act that appropriately relates
its requirements to the legal relationships that bring on the tax. The
statute provides: "Every corporation subject to taxation under this law
shall make a return, stating specifically the items of its gross income and
the deductions and credits allowed by this law."'' The same technique
could be easily adapted to other taxes.
A majority of states already have adequate long arm statutes and
current tax reporting requirements are typically related to liability. In
most cases, therefore, few if any changes would be required before legis-
lative action could be taken to repeal foreign corporation laws.
'I GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3202 (1961).
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